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Sitting in a focus group, a young Jordanian bewailed 
America's relationship with his region: "Since 1948, we have tried peace, but everything 
turned out to be a lie. Looking to the future, we don't see anything except more wars, 
problems and efforts to control our leadership." While in recent years, views of the 
United States have been quite negative around the world, they have been particularly 
virulent in the Middle East. Majorities in some countries have even expressed support for 
attacks on US troops and for key aspects of al Qaeda's anti-US agenda, including driving 
the United States out of the region. 
Thus, there is particular interest in the question of whether a new Obama administration 
might elicit a more positive response from publics in this part of the world. 
Pre-election polling found tepid enthusiasm for Obama. A July-August 2008 
BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA poll of 22 countries around the world found the Middle East 
region to have the lowest level of enthusiasm for Obama. While results indicated more 
favored Obama than McCain in each of the four Middle Eastern countries polled, the 
total percentage expressing support for Obama was very low in the larger countries (26 
percent in both Egypt and Turkey) and fell short of a majority in the smaller countries (39 
percent in Lebanon and 46 percent in the United Arab Emirates [UAE]). 
Asked what effect they thought an Obama presidency would have on US relations with 
the world, in every case the numbers saying relations would be better were less than half: 
Egypt, 29 percent; Turkey, 11 percent; Lebanon, 30 percent; the UAE 40 percent. In 
every case, this was below the worldwide average of 46 percent and far below the robust 
majorities expressing optimism in Europe and Africa. 
A Pew poll conducted in spring 2008 also asked people in five Middle Eastern countries 
how much confidence they had in Obama to do the right thing in international affairs. 
Only small minorities expressed some or a lot of confidence in Pakistan (7 percent), 
Egypt (23 percent), Turkey (7 percent), Jordan (20 percent), and Lebanon (22 percent). 
So if "not being Bush" is not enough to turn around US relations with the Middle East, 
what will it take? A further analysis of polls, as well as focus groups I have conducted in 
five Middle Eastern countries, suggest that there are numerous questions about US policy 
in the Middle East that people there will be looking to the Obama administration to 
answer. The three most central ones are: (1) will the United States continue to have a 
dominating military presence in the region? (2) will the United States play an even-
handed role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? (3) will the United States support 
democratization in the region? 
US Military Presence: Perceptions by the Numbers 
The US military presence in Iraq is, of course, the most visible aspect of US presence in 
the region and a highly unpopular one. One might assume that if the United States were 
to withdraw its combat forces from Iraq on the 16-month timetable that Obama has 
proposed, this would mitigate tensions. This may be the case, but this alone will not 
address the most fundamental concern associated with US military presence. 
To an extent that some US citizens may find difficult to understand, people in the Middle 
East perceive US forces as posing a threat to them. In a 2007 Pew poll of eight Middle 
Eastern nations, majorities ranging from 57 percent in Lebanon to 92 percent in Morocco 
said they were worried "that the US could become a military threat to our country 
someday." Even in Turkey - a NATO ally -- 76 percent had such a worry, as did 61 
percent in Kuwait, a country the United States has defended. 
Polls show very strong support for removing all US military forces from the region. In a 
2007 WorldPublicOpinion.org (WPO) poll, conducted in conjunction with the Study of 
Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START) Center at the University of Maryland, 
large majorities supported the goal of getting "the US to remove its bases and its military 
forces from all Islamic countries" in Morocco (72 percent), Egypt (92 percent), and 
Pakistan (71 percent). 
US bases in the Persian Gulf are similarly quite unpopular. In a 2008 WPO poll, large 
majorities said it is a "bad idea" for the United States to have naval forces in the Persian 
Gulf, including Egyptians (80 percent), Jordanians (76 percent), Palestinians (90 percent), 
and Turks (77 percent). Equally large majorities also believe (apparently correctly) that 
this is the majority view throughout the region. 
The argument that US forces in the region offer stability is not persuasive to Middle 
Eastern audiences. In a 2007 BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA poll, respondents were asked, "Do 
you think the US military presence in the Middle East is a stabilizing force or provokes 
more conflict than it prevents?" Large majorities in all four Middle Eastern countries 
polled said it provokes more conflict than it prevents, including people in Egypt (85 
percent), Turkey (76 percent), Lebanon (77 percent) and even the UAE (66 percent)--a 
country that hosts such a base and is ostensibly more secure as a result. 
US military presence is viewed in the context of several invidious goals widely attributed 
to the United States. One of these assumed goals is to coercively assure US access to oil. 
In a WPO poll, robust majorities agreed with the statement "America pretends to be 
helpful to Muslim countries, but in fact everything it does is really part of a scheme to 
take advantage of people in the Middle East and steal their oil," a position endorsed by 
majorities in Egypt (87 percent), Morocco (62 percent), and Pakistan (56 percent). 
According to one WPO poll, very large majorities said that they think it is a goal of the 
United States to "maintain control over the oil resources of the Middle East," including 
Egyptians (91 percent), Moroccans (82 percent), Pakistanis (68 percent), Jordanians (87 
percent), Palestinians (89 percent), and Turks (89 percent). 
The United States is also seen as having goals hostile to Islam. Large majorities across 
six countries said that a goal of US foreign policy is to "weaken and divide the Islamic 
world," including Egypt (92 percent) the Palestinian Territories (87 percent), Turkey (82 
percent), Jordan (80 percent), Morocco (78 percent), and Pakistan (73 percent). The 
United States is seen as feeling threatened by Islam: large majorities agreed that "It is 
America's goal to weaken Islam so that it will not grow and challenge the Western way of 
life" including in Egypt (87 percent), Morocco (69 percent) and Pakistan (62 percent). 
US foreign policy is even seen as having a pro-Christian agenda. Large majorities see it 
as a US foreign policy goal to "to spread Christianity in the Middle East," including in 
Morocco (67 percent), Pakistan (64 percent). Egypt (74 percent), Jordan (71 percent) the 
Palestinian Territories (88 percent) and Turkey (79 percent). 
In this context, it is not surprising that many people in the Middle East approve of attacks 
on US troops based in the region. In Egypt, at least eight in ten approve of attacking US 
troops in the region. A majority of Moroccans also support targeting US forces, whether 
stationed in the Persian Gulf (52 percent) or fighting in Iraq (68 percent). Pakistanis are 
divided about attacks on the US military--many do not answer or express mixed feelings. 
However, respondents in all three countries roundly reject attacks on US civilians, either 
in the region or in the United States. (WPO 2007). 
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
Needless to say, people in the Middle East will also be closely watching how the Obama 
administration deals with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Were the United States to 
succeed in brokering a peace agreement, this would clearly have a positive effect on 
views of the United States. In a six-country poll in 2008, the Sadat Chair of the 
University of Maryland presented a list of six possible actions the United States could 
take and asked what would improve their views of the United States the most. The one 
that received the most endorsements (picked by 50 percent) was brokering an Israeli-
Palestinian peace agreement, with Israel withdrawing to 1967 borders and establishing a 
Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. Stopping economic and military aid to 
Israel was the 4th most cited (selected by 28 percent). 
But even short of achieving an agreement, people will presumably recognize that the 
United States is not the only factor in success. There will be much interest in how the 
United States is dealing with the conflict. Polls have found substantial dissatisfaction. A 
2008 WPO poll asked people how well the United States is "doing its part in the effort to 
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict"; majorities said not very well or not well at all in 
Egypt (86 percent), Turkey (68 percent), the Palestinian Territories (77 percent), and 
Azerbaijan (58 percent). 
A central theme is that the United States is not even-handed. A May 2007 Pew poll found 
that majorities believe that US policies are not "fair," but "favor Israel too much," in 
Egypt (86 percent), Turkey (70 percent), Jordan (91 percent), Kuwait (86 percent), 
Lebanon (89 percent), Morocco (81 percent), and the Palestinian Territories (90 percent). 
Though al-Qaeda is not popular in and of itself, when presented a list of goals proclaimed 
by al-Qaeda in a 2007 WPO poll, two-thirds or more said that they support the goal of 
trying "to push the United States to stop favoring Israel in its conflict with the 
Palestinians." This included Egypt (95 percent), Morocco (75 percent), and Pakistan (65 
percent). 
Strikingly high numbers doubt that the United States is genuinely seeking to create a 
Palestinian state. WPO asked in 2007 and 2008 whether "the creation of an independent 
and economically viable Palestinian state" is a goal of the United States. Majorities said it 
was not in Egypt (91 percent), Morocco (64 percent), Jordan (63 percent) and Turkey (52 
percent). Interestingly the one case where a majority said that it is a US goal is in the 
Palestinian Territories themselves (59 percent). 
Large numbers even believe that it is a goal of the United States to expand Israeli 
territory. WPO polling found majorities believe it is a US goal to "expand the geographic 
borders of Israel" among Egyptians (91 percent), Palestinians (91 percent), Jordanians 
(84 percent), Turks (78 percent), Moroccans (64 percent), and Pakistanis (62 percent). 
Democracy 
Finally, people in the Middle East will be attending closely to whether the United States 
is genuinely supportive of democracy in the region. Historically, the United States has 
been criticized for backing autocratic governments--such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia--as 
long as they are cooperative with US foreign policy goals. 
In President George W. Bush's 2005 State of the Union speech, he framed the US 
operation in Iraq as a means of promoting democracy and called for a renewed emphasis 
on democracy in the region. This was fairly well received in many quarters and did make 
some impact on government policies in the region, especially in Egypt. However, once 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Hamas in the Palestinian Territories did well in 
elections, the United States quickly backed away from this position. 
This only served to compound existing doubts about US claims to support democracy in 
the region on a principled basis. A summer 2008 WPO poll of five Muslim countries 
found very small numbers saying they believe that "The US favors democracy in Muslim 
countries, whether or not the government is cooperative with the US"--including in Egypt 
(16 percent), Jordan (6 percent), Turkey (7 percent), and the Palestinian Territories (11 
percent). Rather, attitudes were mixed between the view that "The US favors democracy 
in Muslim countries, but only if the government is cooperative with the US" and the view 
that "The US opposes democracy in Muslim countries." 
Similarly, asked by Pew in May 2007 whether the United States "promotes democracy 
wherever it can" or "promotes democracy mostly where it serves its self-interest," 
majorities said the latter in Turkey (76 percent), Egypt (69 percent), Kuwait (82 percent), 
the Palestinian Territories (79 percent), in Pakistan (57 percent), and Jordan (55 percent). 
Only in Morocco did this view fall below half (46 percent), but was still a large plurality. 
A 2006 Sadat Chair poll of six nations found majorities expressing the opinion that 
"democracy is not a real US objective" in Morocco (84 percent), Jordan (74 percent), 
Lebanon (61 percent), and Egypt (55 percent). Only in the UAE was this not a majority 
position. 
Asked in an October 2005 Gallup poll, majorities disagreed with the statement that "The 
United States is serious about...the establishment of democratic systems in this region" in 
Jordan (66 percent), Egypt (64 percent), Iran (56 percent), Pakistan (54 percent), Turkey 
(59 percent), and Lebanon (58 percent). 
Improving the United States' Image in the Middle East 
Concern about the United States's image in the Middle East is not simply a frothy 
concern about being liked, because the United States's image is crucial to its soft power. 
When the United States is unpopular in the region, it is more difficult for governments 
there to cooperate with it and it becomes politically rewarding for leaders to be defiant 
toward the United States. Equally worrisome, when al-Qaeda's criticisms of the United 
States resonate with a majority of the people, this creates a more favorable environment 
for al-Qaeda to raise funds, recruit, and operate. 
At the same time, improving the United States's image is not an absolute value. Concerns 
about its image will not and should not be the preeminent factor driving the Obama 
administration's policy in the Middle East. Thus, the options proposed here for improving 
the United States's image should be seen as a menu to consider in light of a variety of 
factors at play at any given time. 
All other things being equal, the United States should look for opportunities to lighten its 
military footprint in the region. No matter what US leaders say, these forces will continue 
to be perceived as having a threatening aspect and as an instrument of US dominance. 
Simply having a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq will be helpful. Reaffirming the 
intention to not have permanent bases there is key. Whenever possible, US military and 
civilian functions should be transferred to multilateral institutions such as the UN. 
Ramping up forces in Afghanistan will likely create some negative reactions. Here again, 
the more that operations can be imbedded in a multilateral context, in this case the UN-
sanctioned NATO operation, the less it will be perceived as an instrument of US 
domination. The fact that the majority of the Afghan people support the presence of US 
forces there (71 percent in a recent ABC News poll) should also be highlighted, as this 
provides legitimacy. While the high ratio of military effort to civilian effort in 
Afghanistan may be a necessity for security, it is also a cost in terms of Afghans' and 
others' perceptions. Thus, counterbalancing efforts on the civilian side of the US presence 
should be contemplated. 
US military bases in the region should be reevaluated in the context of their soft-power 
costs. Alternatives for policing the Gulf with multilateral forces or with over-the-horizon 
capabilities should be considered. 
Current efforts to link US aid programs to the US military should be reconsidered. While 
they may arguably have a marginal benefit to the military's public relations in the region, 
doing so also enhances the United States's image as a primarily military, and therefore 
implicitly coercive, force in the region. 
Clearly, the United States is going to sustain its commitment to Israel, as Obama has 
affirmed. At the same time, the United States can renew its commitment to the peace 
process. Previous US presidents have at times demonstrated their ability to support Israel 
and the peace process concurrently. Obama's expression of empathy for the suffering of 
the Palestinian people, in addition to his commitment to Israel, is a good step toward 
finding an inclusive equilibrium that can be the basis for a new approach. Letting the 
peace process languish will surely be read as defaulting to the status quo, which is 
perceived as favoring Israel. 
Finally, the Obama administration will have to take a hard look at the costs and benefits 
of pursuing policies that are perceived to be resisting democracy in the region. The 
perception that the United States thinks it has such an over-riding need for access to oil 
that people in the region need to be denied democracy is and will continue to be a major 
source of anger toward the United States and a rallying cry for groups portraying the 
United States as an imperial hegemon. 
The fear that the current regimes in the region hold in place a brittle system that is the 
only one that can reliably ensure the flow of oil needs to be questioned. Changes to the 
present configuration that may come with democratization would not necessarily be for 
the worse. 
This is not to say that all such reevaluations proposed here will lead inexorably to 
changes in policy. While they may improve the United States's image in the region, there 
are risks inherent in lessening US military footprint, seeking a more even-handed posture 
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or being more encouraging of democracy in the region. 
Clearly, though, there are also risks inherent in continuing current policies. 
The start of a new administration offers unique opportunities. It is a moment for a fresh 
reevaluation of US foreign policy from all angles. It is also a period when people in the 
Middle East will be more receptive than usual to seeing the United States in a new way. 
The enmity people in the region currently feel toward the United States has been costly in 
many respects. It will behoove the new administration to take these facts into account as 
it considers the policies that will shape the relationship between the United States and this 
uniquely troubled part of the world. 
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